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Goal-directed choices should be guided by the expected value of the available options. 27 
However, people are often influenced by past costs in their decisions, thus succumbing to a bias 28 
known as the ‘sunk-cost effect’. Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data 29 
show that the sunk-cost effect is associated with increased activity in dorsolateral prefrontal 30 
cortex (dlPFC) and altered crosstalk of the dlPFC with other prefrontal areas. Are these 31 
correlated neural processes causally involved in the sunk-cost effect? Here, we employed 32 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to examine the role of the dlPFC for biasing 33 
choices in line with the cost of past expenses. Specifically, we applied different types of tDCS 34 
over the right dlPFC while participants performed an investment task designed to assess the 35 
impact of past investments on current choices. Our results show a pronounced sunk-cost effect 36 
that was significantly increased by anodal tDCS but left unaltered by cathodal or sham 37 
stimulation. Importantly, choices were not affected by stimulation when no prior investments 38 
had been made, underlining the specificity of the obtained effect. Our findings suggest a critical 39 
role of the dlPFC in the sunk-cost effect and thus elucidate neural mechanisms by which past 40 
investments may influence current decision-making. 41 
 42 
 43 








According to traditional economic theory, humans should base their decisions on the expected 50 
future value of the choice-relevant objects, investments or experiences (Edwards 1954; Frank 51 
and Bernanke 2006; Cabantous and Gond 2011). Choices in everyday life, however, are often 52 
not that rational and smart (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; 53 
Kahneman et al. 1991 Shafir et al. 1993). In particular, when people have invested time, money 54 
or effort into an option, they are often reluctant to abandon it even though its expected value is 55 
not favorable anymore. This tendency to consider past costs that cannot be recovered in current 56 
decision-making is referred to as the ‘sunk-cost effect’ (Arkes and Blumer 1985). The sunk-57 
cost effect has been demonstrated in numerous studies (Garland 1990; Arkes and Hutzel 2000; 58 
van Putten et al. 2010) and it is among the most consequential biases in human decision making: 59 
it can explain why people remain in a failing relationship (Strube 1988) or why they are unable 60 
to leave a dissatisfying job (Arkes and Blumer 1985), it may push up prices in auctions 61 
(Murnighan 2002), drive wars or keep failing policies alive (Staw 1976).  62 
 The past decade has seen significant progress in our understanding of the 63 
neurobiological underpinnings of human decision making (Gold and Shadlen 2007; Kable and 64 
Glimcher 2007; Rangel et al. 2008; Hare et al. 2009; Rushworth et al. 2011; Delgado and 65 
Dickerson 2012; Ruff and Fehr 2014). A large network of interconnected areas has been 66 
implicated in decision-making, including the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex, the 67 
parietal cortex and the ventral striatum (Bechara et al. 1999; Sanfey et al. 2003; De Martino et 68 
al. 2006; Kennerley et al. 2006; Leotti and Delgado 2014). For the representation of the 69 
expected value of an option, which lies at the heart of rational decision-making, the orbitofrontal 70 
cortex (OFC) and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) have been identified as crucial 71 
neural components (Kable and Glimcher 2007; Grabenhorst and Rolls 2011; Jocham et al. 72 
2012). A recent study provided first insights into the neural signature of the sunk-cost effect 73 
(Haller and Schwabe 2014). This study showed that prior investments reduce the activity of the 74 
vmPFC during subsequent decisions and that this reduction in vmPFC activity correlates with 75 
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the magnitude of the sunk-cost effect. Moreover, in line with previous behavioral studies (Arkes 76 
and Ayton 1999), the sunk-cost tendency was associated with the norm not to be wasteful. 77 
Social norms are thought to be represented in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; Sanfey 78 
2003; Baumgartner et al. 2011), and several aspects of the data were consistent with this: First, 79 
the norm not to waste resources correlated with the activity of the right dlPFC, and second, the 80 
right dlPFC showed increased connectivity with the vmPFC when participants had already 81 
made an investment into a certain course of action, compared to when not. Thus, these data 82 
suggest a model for the neural origins of the sunk-cost effect in which the dlPFC, representing 83 
the norm not to waste resources, is activated once an investment has been made and overrides 84 
the vmPFC, thus hampering rational choices based on expected values.  85 
 One obvious weakness of the model proposed above is that it is based solely on 86 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, which are correlational by nature and 87 
therefore not informative about causal relationships between brain activity and behavior. To 88 
formally test for such a causal relationship, we employed transcranial direct current stimulation 89 
(tDCS), a method for non-invasive stimulation of the human brain by means of weak electric 90 
currents (Nitsche and Paulus 2000) that has already successfully been used for demonstrating 91 
the involvement of a brain area in decision-making processes (Fregni et al. 2005; Ruff et al. 92 
2013; Davis et al. 2014). In the present study, we examined how tDCS applied over the dlPFC 93 
affects the biasing influence of past, irrecoverable costs on current decision-making. To this 94 
end, participants performed an investment task that was recently introduced to examine the 95 
sunk-cost effect (Haller and Schwabe 2014). While participants performed this task, we applied 96 
anodal, cathodal, or sham stimulation over the right dlPFC, as our previous fMRI data showed 97 
that in particular the activity of the right dlPFC was linked to the sunk-cost effect (Haller and 98 
Schwabe 2014). Anodal and cathodal tDCS are known to increase or decrease the resting 99 
potential and therefore neural excitability in the targeted regions, respectively (Nitsche and 100 
Paulus 2000), whereas sham tDCS mimics the peripheral effects (i.e., tactile sensations) 101 
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associated with tDCS while not affecting neural processing (Nitsche et al. 2008). We therefore 102 
expected that anodal stimulation over the dlPFC would increase dlPFC activity (and possibly 103 
other connected areas), thereby enhancing the impact of previous investments on decision-104 
making compared to sham stimulation, whereas cathodal stimulation might even have the 105 
opposite effect of reducing the sunk-cost effect.  106 
 107 
Materials and Methods 108 
Participants and Experimental Design 109 
Sixty healthy men and women between 18 and 32 years of age participated in this experiment 110 
(mean age ± SEM: 24.9 ± 3.6 years; 30 women). Exclusion criteria for participation were 111 
checked in a standardized interview prior to testing and comprised current illness, medication 112 
intake, a life-time history of any neurological disorders as well as any contraindications for 113 
tDCS. Participants gave written informed consent before the start of testing and received a 114 
compensation of 12 Euros plus what they won in the investment task at the end of the 115 
experiment. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the German Psychological 116 
Association (DGPs). 117 
 In a double-blind, sham-controlled, between-subject design, participants were randomly 118 
assigned to one of three stimulation conditions (10 men and 10 women per group): anodal, 119 
cathodal, or sham stimulation of the dlPFC. The stimulation lasted for as long as the individual 120 
participant worked on the investment task but not longer than 30 minutes. 121 
 122 
Questionnaires 123 
In order to control for personality traits and behavioral tendencies that are relevant within the 124 
context of the sunk-cost effect and decision-making in general, participants filled out several 125 
questionnaires at the beginning of the experiment. In particular, participants completed the 126 
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German versions of the Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation System scales (BIS/BAS 127 
scales, Carver and White 1994), the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI, McCrae and Costa 128 
2004), the Barratt-Impulsiveness-Scale (BIS-15, Spinella 2007), and a short questionnaire that 129 
assessed the individual sunk-cost tendency and the desire not to appear wasteful (Haller and 130 
Schwabe 2014). The latter consists of 8 items that should be answered on a scale from 1 (“I do 131 
not agree”) to 11 (“I completely agree”). Example items were “I finish a started project, no 132 
matter the cost” or “People who know me think I am wasteful”. A sum score for both the sunk-133 
cost tendency and the desire not to appear wasteful was calculated by summing up the scores 134 
for the four items of each scale.    135 
 136 
Investment Task      137 
The sunk-cost effect was examined with a modified version of a recently developed investment 138 
task (Haller and Schwabe 2014) that was adapted to the time constraints associated with the 139 
safe use of tDCS. In total, participants performed 252 trials of this investment task (average 140 
duration: 28 minutes). On each of these trials, participants were presented with a project 141 
characterized by its costs and probability of success (Figure 1). The costs were either low (0.20 142 
or 0.25 cents) or high (0.60 or 0.65 cents). The probability of success was low (40%), medium 143 
(50%), or high (60%) and corresponded to the actual probability of success implemented in the 144 
program. These probabilities were chosen based on a pilot study showing that probabilities that 145 
were higher than 60% or lower than 40% result in ceiling and floor effects, respectively (Haller 146 
and Schwabe 2014). Participants were instructed to decide whether or not they wanted to invest 147 
the indicated amount of money in the project, by pressing either the right or left arrow key on 148 
a keyboard. If the participants did not respond within 5 s or if they decided not to invest, the 149 
trial was aborted. If the participants decided to invest, they either received immediate feedback 150 
about the success of the project (as determined by the computer program based on the given 151 
probability), or they were informed that further investments would be necessary. If a second 152 
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investment decision was required, participants were presented with the additional costs and the 153 
updated probability of success; again the costs could be low or high and the probability of 154 
success could be low, medium, or high. Participants had again 5 s to decide whether they wanted 155 
to invest the additional money in the project or whether they wanted to abort it. Thus, the only 156 
difference between the first and second investment scenario was whether or not participants 157 
had already invested in the project. If participants decided to continue to invest, they were given 158 
immediate feedback about the success of the project, i.e., there was a maximum of one follow-159 
up investment.  160 
 For the initial investment trials, each of the six combinations of costs (low vs. high) and 161 
probability of success (low vs. medium vs. high) was presented 42 times (252 trial in total). In 162 
one third of the trials, no second investment decision ensued (“no prior investment trials”). In 163 
the rest of the trials, participants were asked to decide whether they wanted to make a second 164 
investment required for the possible success of the project they had already invested in. This 165 
was done to ensure that there were sufficient trials to investigate the influence of past 166 
investments on current decisions. Trials in which a follow-up decision was required were 167 
subdivided into those in which the initial investment was low and those in which the initial 168 
investment was high (“low prior investment trials” and “high prior investment trials”, 169 
respectively). Apart from the size of the previous investment (none, low, high), the three types 170 
of trials were identical, as all possible costs × probability combinations were presented equally 171 
often in these trials. The different trial types were presented in random order. Between trials, a 172 
fixation cross was presented for 1 to 3 s (random jitter: 2 s).   173 
 Critically, participants were told that they would gain 2 Euros for every project that was 174 
completed successfully, but that they would have to pay all investments made regardless of the 175 
success of a project. It was made clear that, in “prior investment trials”, the probability of the 176 
first and second decisions were independent and that the initial investments were lost, 177 
irrespective of the follow-up decision. Participants were further instructed that the computer 178 
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would randomly choose 10 trials at the end of the experiment and calculate their associated 179 
gains or losses. These would then be added to or subtracted from the participants’ 180 
compensation. In order to make sure that participants fully understood the decision-making 181 
task, we asked them to repeat the essential features of the task after they had received the task 182 
instructions. Possible misconceptions were clarified. In particular, we emphasized that, in prior 183 
investment trials, the probabilities in the initial and follow-up decision scenarios are 184 
independent and that any initial investment is lost, irrespective of the follow-up decision. 185 
 186 
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) 187 
Brain stimulation was applied in a double-blind, sham-controlled manner using a Neuroconn 188 
stimulator (Neuroconn, Germany). In line with previous tDCS studies that focused on the dlPFC  189 
(Harty et al. 2014; Zwissler et al. 2014; Axelrod et al. 2015; Pope 2015), we used an EEG cap 190 
and the standard 10-20 system to determine electrode positions individually for each 191 
participant. The smaller electrode (5×5 cm) was positioned over the right dlPFC (position F4). 192 
The larger electrode (10×10 cm), which served as a reference (Nitsche et al. 2007), was fixed 193 
centrally on the head (position CZ). Different electrode sizes were chosen so that a higher, 194 
functionally more effective current density was applied over the dlPFC (the area of interest) 195 
than over the central regions underlying the large electrode. Both electrodes were covered in 196 
sponges soaked with a sodium chloride solution to improve conductivity and to reduce skin 197 
irritation. For active stimulation, we applied a current of 1.075 µA, leading to a current density 198 
of 0.043 mA/cm² for the electrode over the dlPFC and 0.011 mA/cm² for the reference 199 
electrode, making it much less likely for the larger electrode to induce functional effects on the 200 
underlying brain tissue. The electrode setup was identical in all conditions. In the anodal 201 
condition, the electrode over the dlPFC served as the anode whereas the reference electrode 202 
served as the cathode. In the cathodal condition, the polarity of the electrodes was reversed. 203 
Active brain stimulation lasted 30 minutes at most and was stopped once the participant had 204 
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finished the investment task. In all conditions, the current was applied with an 8-s-fade-in and 205 
a 5-s-fade-out-window at the beginning and the end of the stimulation. In the sham condition, 206 
no current was delivered after the initial fade-in-period, to prevent participants from being able 207 
to tell to which condition they had been assigned to. Blinding of the investigator and the 208 
participant was accomplished by using pre-programmed codes of the Neuroconn-stimulator. 209 
Since the stimulation condition was unknown to the investigator and the participant, all 210 
participants were asked to guess in which condition they had been. At the end of the experiment, 211 
participants were debriefed. 212 
 213 
Data Analysis  214 
Investment decisions were analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA with prior investment (no 215 
vs. low vs. high), costs (low vs. high) and probability of success (low vs. medium vs. high) as 216 
within-subject factors and stimulation condition (anodal vs. cathodal vs. sham) as between-217 
subject-factor. Significant main or interaction effects were further pursued by Bonferroni-218 
corrected post-hoc tests. All reported p-values are two-tailed.  219 
 Sunk-cost score: In line with our previous study (Haller and Schwabe 2014), we 220 
calculated a sunk-cost score for each participant based on their investment decisions. We 221 
calculated the individual differences in the percentage of investment decisions between “no 222 
prior investment trials” and “low prior investment trials” as well as the difference between “low 223 
prior investment trials” and “high prior investment trials” for all six combinations of project 224 
costs and probability of success. The average of these difference scores was used as a single 225 
estimate for the individual “sunk-cost tendency”. A high sunk-cost score indicates large 226 






Overall, participants were unable to distinguish the different stimulation types. Treatment 231 
guesses were at chance level (58%) and did not differ between stimulation conditions (χ²2 = 232 
1.78, P = .41). 233 
 234 
Anodal stimulation over the dlPFC boosts the sunk-cost bias  235 
As expected, participants’ investment decisions were strongly influenced by the expected value 236 
of an option, as indicated by significant main effects of costs (F1,57 = 78.44, P < .001, partial η² 237 
= .58) and probability of success (F1.41,80.58 = 160.75, P < .001, partial η² = .74) as well as a 238 
costs × probability of success interaction (F1.33,76.05 = 12.68, P < .001, partial η² = .18). 239 
Critically, our data also demonstrate a pronounced sunk-cost effect: participants’ decisions to 240 
invest or not invest were significantly influenced by whether they had already made an 241 
investment or not (main effect prior investment: F1.79,102.00 = 93.16, P < .001, partial η² = .62). 242 
This tendency to invest more after a prior investment held for both trials where the prior 243 
investment was low or high (low- vs. no prior investment and high- vs. no prior investment: 244 
both P < .001; low- vs. high prior investment: P = .99). As shown in Figure 2a-c, the impact of 245 
prior investments was strongest for options with low expected value and the influence of the 246 
expected value on decision making was significantly modulated by prior investments (costs × 247 
probability of success × prior investment interaction: F3.23,183.89 = 4.10, P = .003, partial η² = 248 
.07).   249 
Most importantly, however, the tendency to continue investing in a project that had 250 
already been invested in (i.e., the sunk-cost effect) was significantly affected by tDCS over the 251 
dlPFC (stimulation × prior investment: F3.58,102.00 = 5.99, P < .001, partial η² = .18). When 252 
participants had not yet invested in a project, stimulation over the dlPFC did not alter their 253 
decision-making (main effect of stimulation in no prior investment trials: F2,57 = .44, P = .65, 254 
partial η² = .02) and choices were exclusively driven by the expected value of the current project 255 
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(see increase in bars in Fig. 2a from left to right; cost × probability of success interaction for no 256 
prior investment trials only: F1.78,57 = 5.87, P = .004, partial η² = .09). However, when 257 
participants had already made a low investment, stimulation over the dlPFC altered their 258 
decision behavior significantly (main effect of stimulation in low prior investment trials: F2,57 259 
= 4.81, P = .012, partial η² = .14): Anodal stimulation led to higher investment rates than sham 260 
stimulation (P < .009), but there was no such effect for cathodal stimulation (P = .36). When 261 
participants had already made a large investment, anodal stimulation over the dlPFC led to 262 
higher investment rates (main effect of stimulation in high prior investment trials: F2,57 = 6.96, 263 
P = .002, partial η² = .20) compared to both sham stimulation (P = .006) and cathodal 264 
stimulation (P = .007), whereas the latter two conditions did not differ (P = .99).  265 
The costs × probability of success × prior investment × stimulation interaction did not 266 
reach statistical significance (F425.59, 183,89 = 1.20, P = .31, partial η² = .04). However, the data 267 
displayed in figure 2 clearly suggest that anodal stimulation over the dlPFC affected most 268 
strongly choices about options with low expected value. We therefore performed an additional 269 
post-hoc ANOVA with the factors expected value (high costs/low probability of success vs. 270 
low costs/high probability of success) × prior investment × stimulation, for the options with the 271 
lowest and highest expected value only. This analysis confirmed that the modulatory influence 272 
of anodal stimulation indeed depended on the expected value of the option (expected value × 273 
prior investment × stimulation interaction: F3.94, 110,99 = 2.79, P = .03, partial η² = .09). 274 
Specifically, anodal stimulation increased the impact of prior investments for options with low 275 
expected value (prior investment × stimulation interaction: F3.97, 113,02 = 3.96, P = .005, partial 276 
η² = .12) but not for projects with high expected value (prior investment × stimulation 277 
interaction: F4, 114 = 0.56, P = .69, partial η² = .02), perhaps reflecting that most participants 278 
decided to invest in these projects anyway. 279 
Additionally, we calculated a sunk-cost score as a single parameter that reflected the 280 
individual sunk-cost tendency. As displayed in Figure 3, stimulation over the dlPFC 281 
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significantly affected participant’s sunk cost tendency (F2,57 = 6.68, P = .002, partial η² = .19): 282 
Anodal dlPFC-stimulation resulted in a significantly higher sunk-cost score than both cathodal 283 
(P = .034) and sham stimulation (P = .003), which did not differ (P = .99). 284 
The analyses reported so far only focused on the expected value and the investments in 285 
the current trial. In order to test whether choices, investments, and outcomes in previous trials 286 
had an influence on decisions in the current trial, we performed a logistic regression analysis in 287 
which the parameters from the previous trials (i.e. previous choice, previous amount invested, 288 
and previous outcome) were included as regressors, in addition to the costs, probability, and 289 
prior investment in the current trial as well as the tDCS condition and the prior investment × 290 
tDCS condition interaction. This analysis showed that participants’ decisions were indeed 291 
influenced by choices (B = .58, p <. 001), investments (B = .11, p = .03), and outcomes (B = -292 
.12, p = .01) on the previous trial: when participants had invested in the previous trial, they were 293 
more likely to invest in the current trial; when they had made a larger investment in the previous 294 
trial, they were more likely to accept higher costs in the current trial; and losses on the previous 295 
trial appeared to motivate participants to invest in the current trial. Critically, however, the 296 
effect of the prior investment in the current trial (i.e., the sunk cost effect) and the prior 297 
investment × tDCS condition interaction remained significant (both B > 1.34, both p < .001) 298 
when the parameters of the previous trial were included in the analysis, indicating that the 299 
specifics of the previous trial cannot explain the observed effects. 300 
 301 
Control variables 302 
We compared participants in the three stimulation groups in a whole range of control variables, 303 
to ensure that they did not differ with respect to their behavioral inhibition, drive, fun seeking 304 
and reward responsiveness (as measured by the BIS/BAS), their neuroticism, extraversion, 305 
openness and agreeableness (as measured by the NEO FFI), their impulsiveness (as measured 306 
by the BIS-15) or their desire not to appear wasteful (as measured by the sunk cost 307 
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questionnaire). There were no such differences for all but one variable (all F < 2.9, all P > .05): 308 
Only for the NEO scale conscientiousness, there was a significant group difference (F2,57 = 309 
5.81, P < .01, partial η² = .17) indicating that participants in the anodal group were less 310 
conscientious than those in the cathodal and sham condition (both P < .05). Thus, we performed 311 
our analyses again with conscientiousness as a covariate. Importantly, however, including 312 
conscientiousness did not alter our findings, indicating that group differences in 313 
conscientiousness could not explain our results. In particular, the significant prior investment × 314 
stimulation interaction remained (F3.61,100.96 = 6.82, P < .001, partial η² = .20) and none of the 315 
effects including the covariate conscientiousness approached significance (all P > .14). Please 316 
note that we did not find any correlations between the individual norm not to waste resources 317 
and the sunk cost-effect (all r > -.08 and < .11, all p > .65), which is most likely due to the fact 318 
that we externally manipulated the brain area representing this norm using tDCS thus changing 319 
its influence on choice behavior but not necessarily the participant’s awareness of the norm 320 
(Knoch et al. 2006; Ruff et al. 2013). 321 
 Finally, given that previous studies reported sex differences in cognitive functions 322 
(Cahill 2006) we tested for possible gender effects by including the participants’ gender as an 323 
additional factor in our analyses. Yet, we did not find any significant main or interaction effects 324 
(all F < 1.95, all p > .12), indicating that men and women did not differ in task performance, 325 
the sunk-cost tendency, or the impact of tDCS. Moreover, including participants’ gender as a 326 
factor did not change any of the other significant results reported above. 327 
 328 
Discussion 329 
The sunk-cost effect is one of the most fundamental biases in human decision making and has 330 
been proposed to underlie a wide range of behaviors, including the decisions to stay in a failing 331 
relationship (Strube 1988), not to leave a dissatisfying job (Arkes and Blumer 1985), or to 332 
adhere to failing policies (Staw 1976). In the present experiment, we sought to elucidate the 333 
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neural mechanisms underlying the sunk-cost effect. More specifically, we employed tDCS over 334 
the right dlPFC during an investment task in order to assess the role of the stimulated brain area 335 
in people’s tendency to consider prior investments during decision-making. We found that 336 
anodal stimulation over the right dlPFC indeed increased the impact of past investments on 337 
current decision-making, thus leading to a more pronounced sunk-cost effect. This effect could 338 
not be attributed to individual differences in personality traits, such as impulsiveness, and it did 339 
not occur after sham or cathodal stimulation.     340 
 Our data are consistent with the view that the dlPFC plays an important role in the sunk-341 
cost effect. In addition, the present findings support a model in which the dlPFC implements 342 
the norm not to be wasteful, which then counteracts decision-making based solely on expected 343 
values. The dlPFC is generally thought to influence decision-making by bringing abstract rules 344 
and norm-based-behavior into action (Sanfey 2003; Koechlin and Summerfield 2007; 345 
Baumgartner et al. 2011; Crockett et al. 2013; Ruff et al. 2013). In line with this view, recent 346 
fMRI data showed that the activity of the dlPFC is related to the individual norm not to waste 347 
resources, which is one of the major sources of the sunk-cost effect (Arkes and Blumer 1985) 348 
and which is itself associated with an increased sunk-cost tendency (Haller and Schwabe 2014). 349 
Alternatively, the increased sunk-cost effect after anodal stimulation over the dlPFC may have 350 
been due to a more general influence on working memory processes required for the present 351 
task. In primates, dlPFC cells code for both choices and outcomes not only of the current trial, 352 
but also of past trials (Seo et al. 2007) and the key role of the dlPFC in working memory in 353 
general has been well-established (Fuster and Alexander 1971; Jonides et al. 1993; Curtis and 354 
D'Esposito 2003). Stimulation over the dlPFC might thus have led to a more pronounced sunk-355 
cost effect by amplifying representations of previous investments in working memory. On the 356 
other hand, implementing social norms such as the norm not to waste resources may resemble 357 
a resourceful top-down control process that helps us to incorporate the rules of our social 358 
environment in our decisions. Anodal stimulation over the dlPFC may have over-activated this 359 
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abstract rule, thus impeding value-based decision making. However, these alternatives are not 360 
mutually exclusive. After all, in order to be an effective top-down influence, any social norm 361 
needs to be represented in working memory. 362 
Importantly, however, anodal stimulation over the dlPFC did not affect decision-making 363 
when participants had not yet invested in a project. Moreover, if participants had not yet made 364 
an investment, decision-making in the anodal tDCS group was mainly based on the expected 365 
value of an option, exactly as for the other experimental groups. Thus, our findings clearly show 366 
that dlPFC stimulation neither affected decision-making in general nor rendered decision-367 
making based on expected values impossible. Rather, the impact of anodal stimulation over the 368 
dlPFC was specific to situations when prior investments had triggered top-down regulation 369 
processes, presumably related to activating the norm not to waste resources or working memory 370 
processes. 371 
Although anodal stimulation over the dlPFC had a critical impact on the strength of the 372 
sunk-cost effect, it is in our view unlikely that the dlPFC drives this effect in isolation. Instead, 373 
our data are consistent with the hypothesis that dlPFC stimulation may have altered the crosstalk 374 
of the dlPFC with other areas critical for decision-making, in particular the vmPFC. The vmPFC 375 
is a key structure for value-based decision-making (Tom et al. 2007; Grabenhorst and Rolls 376 
2011) and our previous data indicate that prior investments enhance the interaction of dlPFC 377 
and vmPFC, resulting in a decrease of vmPFC activity (Haller and Schwabe 2014). When 378 
activated by relevant past investments, the dlPFC may override vmPFC activity and thus 379 
hamper decision-making based on the current value of an option. Such a modulating influence 380 
of the dlPFC on vmPFC activity has also been suggested by other studies examining other types 381 
of decisions (Hare et al. 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2011). Thus, our data lead to the interesting 382 
proposal for future studies that anodal stimulation targeting at the dlPFC may modulate the 383 
interplay of prefrontal areas with areas involved in valuation, in a manner that biases decision-384 
making towards rather abstract norms at the expense of ‘rational’ decision-making based on the 385 
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actual value of an option. Importantly, while previous findings related this modulatory 386 
influence of the dlPFC on the vmPFC to self-control, fostering advantageous decision-making 387 
(Hare et al. 2009), the present findings suggest that ‘top-down’ influences on decision-making 388 
are not necessarily beneficial. More specifically, our findings may imply that the over-389 
activation of norms or past investments, represented in the dlPFC, may impede value-based 390 
decision-making, depending on the specific demands of a situation. 391 
 As expected, the sunk-cost effect was most pronounced for options with low expected 392 
value, i.e., for rather disadvantageous options in which participants invested only when they 393 
had already made an investment. Moreover, anodal stimulation over the dlPFC increased the 394 
influence of prior investments specifically for low expected value options, thus rendering 395 
decision-making even more unfavorable. Previous research has suggested that the sunk-cost 396 
effect may also be dependent on the amount of resources invested, with higher prior investments 397 
leading to a stronger sunk-cost effect (Haller and Schwabe 2014). At least for the option with 398 
the lowest expected value, this pattern was also obtained in the present experiment, both after 399 
sham and anodal dlPFC stimulation.  400 
 TDCS is a safe, non-invasive method that allows assessing the role of cortical brain 401 
areas in cognitive processes such as decision-making. It is, however, important to note that the 402 
spatial resolution of this method is limited due to the size of the electrodes. Based on our 403 
previous fMRI results that identified the dlPFC as the critical area for the sunk-cost effect 404 
(Haller and Schwabe 2014), we chose an electrode position (F4 in the standard EEG 10-20 405 
system) that has been used in previous studies that the targeted dlPFC (Fregni et al. 2005; Harty 406 
et al. 2014; Zmigrod et al. 2014; Zwissler et al. 2014; Axelrod et al. 2015; Pope 2015). Studies 407 
that combined tDCS with fMRI confirmed that stimulation over this (or the contralateral F3) 408 
site led to changes in dlPFC activation (Stagg et al. 2013; Weber et al. 2014). Note, however, 409 
that the changes in activation were not limited to the dlPFC but also included neighboring and 410 
other connected areas. While it cannot be ruled out from a physiological perspective that the 411 
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stimulation affected also cortices adjacent to the dlPFC, it is important to note that none of these 412 
adjacent cortices was activated in our previous fMRI study (Haller and Schwabe 2014). The 413 
tDCS effects on the sunk-cost bias observed here are thus highly likely to reflect modulation of 414 
task-relevant activity in the dlPFC, rather than in adjacent structures that are known not to be 415 
involved in this effect. Finally, it is important to note that in spite of the evidence for 416 
physiologically inhibitory influences of cathodal stimulation (Nitsche and Paulus 2000), we did 417 
not obtain an effect of cathodal dlPFC on the sunk-cost effect. This lack of behavioral effects 418 
for cathodal stimulation appears generally consistent with a whole range of other studies that 419 
did not find differences between sham and cathodal stimulation (e.g. Kincses et al. 2004; 420 
Marshall et al. 2005; Sparing et al. 2008), and with proposals that the effect of cathodal 421 
stimulation may be task-dependent and less reliable than that of anodal stimulation (for a review 422 
see Jacobson et al. 2012). Alternatively, the lack of cathodal effects in our study may reflect a 423 
floor effect, as the options with low expected value were rarely chosen even in the sham 424 
condition. This may have made it difficult to bias choice towards choosing these options even 425 
less often. In any case, the lack of behavioral effects in the cathodal condition perfectly controls 426 
for any unspecific non-neural effects of the ongoing tDCS and clearly demonstrates that the 427 
enhancements of the sunk-cost effect during anodal tDCS reflects the specific neural effects of 428 
this intervention.  429 
To conclude, we show here that anodal stimulation over the right dlPFC boosts people’s 430 
tendency to consider past expenses during current decision-making, suggesting that the 431 
stimulated brain area may play a critical role in the sunk-cost effect. Given that this effect leads 432 
to increased investments in rather disadvantageous options, these data show that anodal 433 
stimulation does not always improve decision-making but may also counteract optimal choices 434 
by enhancing a decision-making bias (see also Xue et al. 2011). The present findings shed light 435 
on the brain mechanisms underlying the well-known human tendency to continue to ‘throw 436 
good money after bad’, which may have considerable consequences for understanding 437 
18 
 
maladaptive decisions in politics (Staw 1976), financial markets (Murnighan 2002), and in our 438 
everyday lives (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Strube 1988).   439 
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Figure captions: 589 
 590 
Figure 1. The investment task. On each trial, participants were presented with a project 591 
characterized by its costs (low vs. high) and its probability of success (low vs. medium vs. 592 
high). Participants were instructed to decide whether they want to invest the depicted costs in 593 
the project. If they decided to invest, they either received immediate feedback about the 594 
project’s success (no prior investment trials) or were told, that additional investments would be 595 
necessary (low- and high prior investment trials). In the latter case, participants were presented 596 
with the additional costs and the updated probabilities of success for the project. The no-, low- 597 
and high prior investment trials differed only in whether and how much participants had already 598 
invested in the project.   599 
 600 
Figure 2. Participants’ investment decisions depend on prior investments and dlPFC 601 
stimulation. Participants’ decisions to invest generally reflected the expected value of an 602 
option. However, the influence of the expected value decreased significantly when participants 603 
had already made an investment (b and c), indicating a sunk-cost effect. Anodal stimulation of 604 
the dlPFC led to a more pronounced sunk-cost effect, as evident in significantly more choices 605 
to invest in trials with low or high prior investments; this effect appeared to be most pronounced 606 
for projects with low expected value. When participants had not yet invested in a project (a), 607 
anodal stimulation did not alter decision behavior. Cathodal or sham stimulation did not alter 608 
decision-making. *P < .05, **P < .01. P-values are corrected for multiple comparisons.      609 
 610 
Figure 3. Impact of dlPFC stimulation on the sunk cost score. The sunk cost score was 611 
calculated as a single index of the subjects’ tendency to consider past investments in current 612 
decisions. A higher score indicates a more pronounced sunk-cost effect. Anodal stimulation 613 
25 
 
led to a higher sunk cost score than both cathodal and sham stimulation. *P < .05, **P < .01. 614 
P-values are corrected for multiple comparisons.    615 
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